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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTRY CLUB FOODS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GALE V. BARNEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9192 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Seventh 
Judicial District Court arising out of an action on a motor 
vehicle collision that occurred on February 23, 1956 in the 
city of Price, Utah, and in which a vehicle owned and operated 
by the defendant-appellant was involved with a vehicle owned 
by plaintiff-respondent and driven by its employee. The trial 
judge, the Honorable F. W. Keller, sitting without a jury, 
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found the issues in favor of plaintiff and against defendant 
and gave judgment in harmony with his findings for the 
amount stipulated to by counsel for the respective parties. It 
is from the findings and judgment that this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 23rd day of February, 1956, at approximately 
8:40 o'clock A.M., Lavoy B. Gale, an employee of plaintiff, 
Country Club Foods, while in the course of his employment, 
was driving his employer's 1951 Chevrolet one and one-half 
ton truck at a speed of approximately 20 to 25 miles per hour 
in a southerly direction along Sixth East Street in Price, Utah. 
At that time, defendant, Gale V. Barney, was driving his 
1948 Dodge one-half ton pick-up truck at a speed of approxi-
mately 20 miles per hour in an easterly direction along Third 
South Street in the same city. Sixth East Street and Third 
South Street were gravel roads about 18 feet in width with 
12 feet additional width for shoulders and formed an open 
intersection which did not have traffic controls of any kind. 
When Mr. Gale reached a point in the vicinity of one-
quarter of a block from the intersection he looked to his right 
and observed the vehicle being driven by defendant about 
one-half block from the intersection and approaching it at an 
unknown rate of speed. After observing the vehicle approaching 
from his right plaintiff's employee driver did not thereafter 
look to his right again until he had entered the intersection 
and reached the center thereof. It was not until that time that 
he became aware of the proximity of defendant's pick-up truck 
or the imminence of the collision. Mr. Gale attempted to 
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avoid the accident by swerving to the left but a collision oc-
curred between the two vehicles. The front end of defendant's 
pick-up truck collided with plaintiff's truck near its right rear 
wheel. 
The northwest corner of the intersection, which was the 
common corner of the intersection between the two vehicles, 
was, at the time of the accident, a flat vacant field enclosed 
by a barbed wire fence. Both drivers could readily see across 
the open field and observe each other and any other vehicles or 
pedestrians approaching the intersection for a dist4nce of one 
block from the right or left as the case might be. 
At the trial of this case, after the conclusion of the evi-
dence by both parties and argument by counsel, the trial judge 
indicated that, "it may be that there is some negligence on the 
part of plaintiff," but that such negligence was not a proximate 
or contributing cause of this collision. He also asserted that 
he was satisfied that if defendant had been looking the accident 
never would have occurred (R. 27). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF'S EM-
PLOYEE DRIVER WAS' GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE 
WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED 
TO THE COLLISION AND PLAINTIFF'S RESULTING 
DAMAGE, .AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS IM-
PUTED TO PLAINTIFF AND SHOULD HAVE BARRED 
PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY. 
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POINT II 
THAT THE NEGLIGENCE CLAIMED BY DEFENDANT 
ON THE PART OF PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYEE DRIVER, 
IF FOUND FROM THE RECORD, MUST NECESSARILY 
HAVE BEEN A CONTRIBUTING, PROXIMATE CAUSE 
OF THE ACCIDENT AND ITS RESULTING DAMAGE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF'S EM-
PLOYEE DRIVER WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE 
WHICH PROXI~IATELY CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED 
TO THE COLLISION AND PLAINTIFF'S RESULTING 
DAMAGE, AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS IM-
PUTED TO PLAINTIFF AND SHOULD HAVE BARRED 
PLAINTIFF'S -RECOVERY. 
It is undisputed that since plaintiff's employee driver was 
acting in the course of his employment when the collision and 
its resulting damage occurred, his negligence, if any, is imputed 
to plaintiff, Country Club Foods. 
Defendant's contention expressed in Point I is based upon 
the testimony elicited from Lavoy B. Gale, plaintiff's employee, 
on direct examination and upon cross examination during the 
trial. Mr. Gale's testimony is that while driving his employer's 
truck in the course of his employment at a speed of between 
20 and 2 5 miles per hour in a southerly direction along Sixth 
East Street in Price, Utah, he approached the intersection of 
Sixth East Street and Third South Street. This is an open 
intersection (R. 5, 19). When he got to a point which he 
6· 
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estimated to be about one-quarter of a block from the inter-
section he looked across the open field which formed . the 
common corner of the intersection between the two vehicles 
and observed defendant's truck approaching the intersection 
from Third South Street. Mr. Gale estimated defendant's 
vehicle to be about one-half block from the intersection but 
he did not know nor could he estimate the speed at which 
it was traveling (R. 15, 17). After apprising himself of the 
fact that another vehicle was approaching the intersectioh and 
that it was traveling at an unknown rate of speed and pos-
sessing the directional right-of-way, plaintiff's employee drove 
one-quarter of a block and entered the intersection without 
again looking to his right, thus disregarding any other ve~icular ," 
traffic approaching the intersection or any pedestrian traffic, 
adult or ipfant, which may have been approaching the inter-
section from the iright (R. 15, 17, 18, 19). That Mr. Gale's 
vision was not obscured in relation to defendant's vehicle or 
any other vehicle, object or person that was approaching the 
intersection from the right is amply shown by testimony re-
ceived at the trial (R. 10, 18, 24). 
The Utah cases are legion to the effect that one approach-
ing or entering an intersection whether or not he is t.Q,e. favored 
driver has a duty to use due care in proceeding into and across· 
the intersection. It is true that a motorist does not have the 
burden to drive so carefully that he will always be prepared 
for and to be able to avoid negligence of another, but he does 
have the burden to keep a proper lookout and to use reasonable 
care to avoid a collision and he is not permitted to close. his 
eyes to other vehicles which he knows or ought to know, or 
has reason to believe are approaching simply because a statute 
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or municipal ordinance designates him the favored driver. 
Hickok v. Skinner, Utah, 190 P. 2d 514 (1948). 
In that case the Court declared that the fact that a motorist 
has looked once and. has concluded that he has time to clear 
the intersection does. not relieve him of negligence in not 
having looked again where he is uninformed as to the speed of 
the approaching automobile and where the speed at which the 
motorist is travelling, combined with the distance he has to 
travel before entering the path of the approaching vehicle 
permits him time to look again and reappraise the relative 
positions of the automobiles and permits an opportunity to 
correct the first conclusion if it is erroneous. Hickok v. Skinner, 
op. cit. 
The recent case of Johnson v. Syme, Admx., 6 Utah 2d 
319, 313 P. 2d 468 (1957), dea.ls with an automobile accident 
at a cont~olled intersection on an arterial highway. In this 
case plaintiff was driving north on U.S. Highway 91 approach-
ing the Draper Road. She collided with a car driven by de-
fendant's decedent who drove onto the highway from a road 
approaching from the right (the Draper Road). The driver 
whose administratrix was defendant in the case was killed. 
The car he was driving did not stop or slow down for the stop 
sign which was designed to control westbound traffic on the 
Draper Road. Plaintiff, who was familiar with the intersection 
and the highway, admitted that she did not see decedent's car 
until it was directly in front of her. However, witnesses whc 
were following plaintiff about a block behind had no difficulty 
in observing and watching the whole occurrance including 
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decedent's car's approach toward the highway from a con-
siderable distance along the Draper Road, through the stop 
sign, into the intersection and onto the collision and fatality. 
In its opinion, 6 Utah 2d 319, the Court said: 
"Under such circumstances we cannot but conclude 
that plaintiff either looked and failed to see the obvious, 
or failed to look at all, and, as a matter of law negli-
gent! y contributed to her own in juries and the death 
of another motorist. 
"In other instances of negligent failure to look or to 
see that which is there to be seen, where the facts were 
no stronger than those here, we have concluded, as we 
do here, that there was contributory negligence as a 
matter of law which precluded recovery." 
Cases cited to support this decision are Sant v. Miller, 
115 Utah 559, 206 P. 2d 719; Cederloff v. Whited, 110 Utah 
45, 169 P. 2d 777; Mingus v. Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P. 
2d 495; Cox v. Thompson, Utah 254 P. 2d 1047; Wilkinson 
v. Oregon Short R. R. Co., 35 Utah 110, 99 P. 466; Covington 
v. Carpenter, 4 Utah 2d 378, 294 P. 2d 788. 
It is worthy of note at this point that Johnson v. Syme, 
op. ct., deals with an arterial through highway intersection 
protected by a stop sign. This made plaitniff' s position in that 
case much stronger than plaintiff's position in the case now· 
before the Court; and if Mrs. Johnson was found contribu-
torily negligent for failing to keep a proper lookout, which 
negligence was held to be a contributing and proximate cause 
of the collision and resulting injury, a fortiori plaintiff's em-
ployee in the case now on appeal was guilty of contributory 
negligence which was a proximate cause of the collision and 
resulting damage in this particular fact situation; 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Other Utah cases dealing with .this point are: 
Gren v. Norton, Utah 213 P. 2d 356 ( 1949), where the 
Court said that the fact that a statute gives a motorist a right 
of way into an intersection does not permit him to proceed 
across without observing the movement of other vehicles which 
rna y ·be moving into and across the intersection. 
In Conklin v. Walsh, 113 U. 276, 193 P. 2d 437 (1948), 
the Court held that the duty to keep a proper lookout applies 
as well to the favored driver on an arterial highway as to the 
disfavored driver on an intersecting street, and neither can 
excuse his own failure to observe because the other driver 
failed his duty. 
Bullock v. Luke, 98 U. 501, 98 P. 2d 350 (1940), in-
volved a vehicle collision at an open intersection where the 
driver on the right did not see the driver on the left, although 
the latter was visible for 800 feet, until he' was 15 or 20 feet 
from the intersection. In disposing of the matter the Court 
held that the rights of the possessor of the right-of-way under 
such a statute are only relative, and one is not relieved of the 
duty of using due care simply because he is the apparent pos-
sessor of the right-of-way. At 98 P.2d 350, 352 the Court 
declared: 
"No driver is at any time excusable for want of 
vigilance or failure to observe what may plainly be 
seen." 
Although plaintiff had the right-of-way on approaching 
an intersection in Martin v. Stevens, 121 U. 484, 243 P. 2d 
747, 751 (1952), the Court indicated in that case that there 
devolved upon plaintiff the duty of due care in observing 
other traffic. 
10 
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In Sine v. Salt Lake Transportation Company, 106 U. 289, 
147 P. 2d 875, 880, ( 1944), it was declared that: 
"Actual possession of the right-of-way, as opposed 
to a physical position of two vehicles with reference to 
the intersection which under the statute confer it, (the 
right-of-way) presupposes that motorists entering the 
intersection have exercised due care, including that of 
keeping a proper lookout." 
Text authority supporting defendant's position is as fol-
lows: 
"A motorist intending to cross a street in front of 
another car should so watch and time the movement 
of the other car as to reasonably insure safe passage, 
either in front or rear thereof, stopping and waiting 
if necessary.'' 
2 Blashfi.eld, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, 
Pern. Ed., Sees. 1023, 1038, op. 271, 230. 
Appellant therefore contends, on the basis of the record 
and the authorities on this point, that as a matter of law, the 
trial court was bound to find plaintiff's employee driver guilty 
of negligence that was a contributing and proximate cause of 
the collision, that such negligence was imputable to plaintiff, 
that s.uch negligence precluded recovery on the part of plaintiff 
against defendant, and that the trial court erred in not so 
finding and giving judgment accordingly. 
POINT II 
THAT THE NEGLIGENCE CLAIMED BY DEFENDANT 
ON THE PART OF PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYEE DRIVER, 
11 
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IF FOUND FROM THE RECORD, MUST J\TECESSARILY 
HAVE BEEN A CONTRIBUTING, PROXIMATE· CAUSE 
OF THE ACCIDENT AND ITS RESULTING DAMAGE. 
Proximate cause is defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 
Fourth Edition, p. 1391, as: 
.. "An act or omission immediately causing. or failing 
to prevent injury; an act or omission occurring or con-
curring with another, which, had it not happened, 
injury would not have been inflicted." 
The word "proximate" means "near," and any particular 
conduct, to be a proximate cause of injury, must be effective 
as a cause at the time the injury is inflicted, and in one of three · 
ways: It must immediately precede and lead into the injury, 
or, if the conduct began or was done at a prior time, either 
it or a condition created by it must continue to the time of 
injury. Alexander v. Hammarberg, 108 Cal. App. 2d 872, 230 
P. 2d 399; Gall v. Union Ice Co., 108 Cal. App. 203, 239 
P. 2d 2d 48; Shivers v. Von Lobensels, 109 Cal. App. 2d 286, 
240 P. 2d 635; Dodge v. San Diego Electric Ry. Co., 92 Cal. 
App. 2d 759, 208 P. 2d 37; Kittman v. Levine, 115 Cal. App. 
2d 844, 253 P. 2d 102. 
So far as the lookout kept by plaintiff's employee driver, 
Mr. Gale, is concerned, the record reveals that he looked to 
his right when about one-quarter of a block from the inter-
section. He saw defendant's vehicle approaching the inter-
section at an unknown speed and he did not thereafter look 
again until he had entered the intersection and this, despite 
the fact that his view to the west on Third South Street was 
unobscured for a distance of the whole block within which 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
limits defendant's truck and any other vehicle or pedestrian 
traffic was visible at all times. 
The trial judge asserted that he was confident that if 
defendant had been looking the accident never would have 
occurred. By the same token, by his utter failure to look until 
a time when the accident had become unavoidable, plaintiff's 
employee driver, Gale, deprived himself of the opportunity 
to do anything which might have avoided the collision. He 
kept no lookout ,such as would be effective for avoidance of 
the accident. 
The Court's attention is respectfully directed to the 
authorities cited and discussed in the argument to Point I in 
this brief. In those cases the negligence was held to be con-
tributory negligence proximately causing the collision and 
damage there involved. 
It is, therefore, the contention of defendant that plaintiff's 
employee driver's failure to keep a proper lookout when pre-
paring to and entering an open intersection and his failure 
to keep the vehicle he was operating under control was negli-
gence on his part that contributed to and was the proximate 
cause of the collision and such negligence should have been 
found as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence from the record is clear that plaintiff's em-
ployee driver was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
of law and that such negligence was a contributing and proxi-
mate cause of the collision and the damage resulting there-
13 
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from. It is also equally clear that the negligence of plaintiff's 
employee driver is imputed to the plaintiff. 
Therefore, the judgment of the trial court in favor of 
plaintiff and against defendant should be set aside and a judg-
ment of no cause of action entered against the plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
D. Gary Christian 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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